Using U.S. steel firm data, we find that lobbying for import protection appears to be habit-forming. To identify heterogeneity in lobbying behavior among firms, we use an Expectation-Maximization algorithm to sort our firms into groups with different propensities to lobby and estimate the determinants of lobbying in each group. A twopool model emerges. occasional lobbyers' lobbying depends on their market performance and habitual lobbyers' lobbying only depends on past lobbying. The latter tends to be larger steel firms whose business is more focused in steel. Our evidence is consistent with dynamic economies of scale in protection seeking breeding protection-dependent firms.
I. Introduction
Rent-seeking activities plausibly have dynamic economies to scale. Past rentseeking experience should reduce the cost of further rent seeking and increase its return.
Thus rent-seekers may, over time, become more prone to further rent seeking and even become dependent on rent seeking. Given the large w elfare losses theoretically associated with rent seeking (e.g. Bhagwati 1982 and Magee et al. 1989 ), a better understanding of actual rent seeking behavior is required.
In particular, empirical verification of the self-sustaining nature of rent seeking is of fundamental importance.
Lobbying for protection from import competition is a form of rent seeking. This paper uses data on lobbying for protection by firms in the steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s to show that a habit-forming effect does exist. In a preliminary investigation, we pool all firm level data and find that past lobbying increases the current tendency to lobby. However, not all firms have the same propensity to lobby. To allow heterogeneity among firms' dependence on past lobbying, we apply an EM (expectationmaximization) algorithm approach (Dempster, Laird, and Rubin, 1977) to a laggeddummy model (Heckman, 1982a; 1982b) . This lets our firms sort themselves into groups according to the determinants of their lobbying activity.
Our statistical results suggest that an acceptable division of our data is a division into two groups: occasional lobbyers, whose lobbying depends on the firm's market performance; and habitual lobbyers, whose lobbying is essentially unrelated to the firm's business situation and depends mainly on past lobbying. Firms that never lobby for protection end up in the first group. Greater f irm size and greater focus in steel production are associated with increased lobbying in both groups, but the influence is stronger for occasional lobbyers. Past sales growth and spending on modern equipment are associated with curtailed lobbying by occasional rent-seekers, but are unrelated to lobbying by habitual rent-seekers. Changes in cash flow have no influence in e ither.
Generally, habitual lobbyers are larger firms whose business is more concentrated on steel. They then are naturally more inclined than occasional lobbyers to initiate lobbying.
However, their lobbying appears to have become a habit devoiced from their market performance. These results are consistent with the presence of economies of scale in rent-seeking and with rent seeking being habit-forming (e.g. Magee et al. (1989) .
In the next section, we describe the intensive lobbying for protection in the U.S.
steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s. We justify our contentions that lobbying for protection by steel firms in the sample period may be habit-forming, and that different groups of firms should have dissimilar propensities to lobby for protection. In section three, we explain the EM algorithm approach. We explain the data in the fourth section and report our results in section five. Section six concludes.
II. Habitual and Occasional Lobbying in the US Steel Industry
In the U.S., domestic firms under import competition pressure often complain to the government about "unfair" foreign practice. These complaints usually allege either unfair foreign government subsidies or dumping. The U.S. government then investigates the veracity of these claims and decides whether or not material injury has occurred.
Sometimes, complainants invoke the "escape clause" (Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act), which allows temporary protection if imports are causing material injury to a U.S.
industry. Foreign f irms must actively participate in these investigations to try to prevent biased readings of the data and the subsequent erection of trade barriers. The process is commonly regarded as prejudiced and as a form of administered trade protection (Finger, Hall, and Nelson, 1982, p. 452-466 ) that coerces foreign firms to curtail their penetration of the US market (e.g. see Hartigan, Perry, and Kamma, 1986 [p. 610-617] and Staiger and Wolak, 1994) .
The American steel industry confronted intensifying import competition during the 1970s and early 1980s. Deardorff and Stern (1988) report the U.S. trade deficit in steel almost tripled, from $2 billion to $5.9 billion between 1973 and 1983 . Crandall (1987 Faced with this onslaught of lobbying, the U.S. government implemented a series of protectionist policies. "Trigger price mechanisms" were established in 1977 and again 1 The latter was widely perceived as more sympathetic to protectionist arguments. Table 2 .5 in Deardorff and Stern (1988) shows that the number of investigations related to trade complaints jumped from one on two per year in the late 1970's to 8 in 1980, 8 in 1981, and 159 in 1982. 2 Following the filing of an anti-dumping case, Argentina. The EC export restraints were strengthened, and similar agreements were quickly reached between the US and all major steel exporters. The effects of these protection measures are examined in Crandall (1987) and Lenway, Morck, and Yeung (1996) . Their evidence suggests that trade protection of the U.S. steel industry was the fruit of rent seeking and benefited managers and steel workers with tenure-seniority, but did little to improve the competitiveness of American steel firms. Murphy et al. 1993) Protection can generate negative externalities. Lenway, Morck, and Yeung (1996) find that protection seeking US steel firms appeared to politically engineer protection that benefited their stakeholders; but that harmed those more profitable and innovative US steel firms that did not explicitly seek protection.
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(See also Crandall, 1987 which studies the Steel industry, and for general results, see Magee et al. 1989 and Murphy et al, 1993) .
Understandably, therefore, attitudes towards protection may vary across firms in the same industry. While many steel firms actively and repeatedly sought protection, many other firms did so rarely or not at all. Some might be free riding on other firms' lobbying. Some may be in the process of developing a lobbying habit. However, a small minority of steel firms clearly stated their objection to protection during various congressional hearings in the nineteen-eighties. For example, innovative and profitable steel firms like Nucor explicitly lobbied against trade barriers. Much previous research on lobbying uses industry level data, and so misses such intra-industry differences. Firm level studies, like Lenway, Morck, and Yeung (1996) point to such differences being potentially important. 4 Using a cross-section of firm-level data, Lenway et al. (1996) find lobbying firms to be larger, less profitable and less invested in R&D than non-lobbyers. They show that comprehensive quota protection raised the value of only the lobbying firms, not the more competitive nonlobbying firms. Moreover, the impact of protection on non-lobbying firms' values is negatively related to their past spending on innovation. They also show that protection raises compensation to lobbying firms' CEO, and that this is unrelated to changes in profitability. Finally, although protection does not mitigate the loss of jobs in lobbying firms, it does increase the wages of workers in lobbying firms who manage to keep their jobs. For non-lobbying firms, protection significantly affects neither wages nor job losses. 
III. An EM Algorithm Approach
In this section, we present our model of lobbying behavior, explain why standard estimation techniques fail in this context, and the provide intuition for our estimation procedure, the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. The technical details of the variant of the EM algorithm we use are described in the appendix at the end of this paper.
The Model of Lobbying Behavior
Our contention is that the determinants of lobbying activity may be different for different sorts of firms. In particular, we postulate t hat past lobbying experience might be the primary determinant of current lobbying activity for some firms, but that various current firm characteristics might be the primary determinants of lobbying in other firms.
We therefore require a model of lobbying activity within which we can nest both possibilities.
To do this, we use a Heckman (1982 a, b) lagged-dummy model. We define the dummy variable
We assume an unobservable underlying "lobbying profit" * it y for firm i in period t. This lobbying profit can depend on a vector of firm i's current characteristics, x it , and on the lagged value of the dummy variable y i,t-, which is one if the firm lobbied during the previous period and zero if it did not. Firm i's profit from lobbying in period t is thus
where ε it is an iid normal random variable with mean zero and the unknown parameters β k ,α k and b k can take different values for each of the K different subsamples. The model thus allows firm i's lobbying profits at time t depends on the firm's current characteristics, x it , and on its past lobbying to different extents in different subsamples.
We cannot observe the lobbying profits, y > 0. It follows that the probability firm i, belonging to subsample k, lobbies in period t is where P denotes probability, and Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
Equation (2) relates observed lobbying (rather than unobserved lobbying profit) to observed past lobbying and firm characteristics for firms in each subsample k.
We assume that our sample of firms can be partitioned into K subsamples, with
We do not know which firms actually belong to which subsample, so we assume the true partition to be described by the multinomial random variable z i = (z i1 , ... z iK ), such that
We assume the elements of z i to be iid (independently and identically distributed) and to have a multinomial distribution with probabilities q = (q 1 , ... q K ).
The Estimation Problem
Our statistical procedure is complicated b y the fact that we must use the same firm-level data for two purposes: 1). To partition the sample of firms according to the way their lobbying is related to past lobbying and other firm characteristics.
2). To estimate how past lobbying and firm characteristics determine current lobbying within each subsample.
If we knew to which subsample each firm belonged, estimating how past lobbying and firm characteristics determine current lobbying would be a straightforward application of logit or probit regression analysis. Alternatively, if we knew the true relationship linking current lobbying to firm characteristics and past lobbying for each theoretical subsample, dividing the firms into subsamples would also be trivial.
The problem is that we know neither. Moreover, the relationships linking current lobbying to past lobbying and other firm characteristics that we estimate depend on how the sample is partitioned, and the partition we choose depends on the relationships to which we compare our firm-level data.
The Intuition Behind the EM Algorithm
Such estimation problems can be overcome using a recursive algorithm. The specific approach we employ is the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm described by Dempster, Laird, and Rubin (1977) , and illustrated in Figure 1 . The intuition underlying this approach is easily described by going through the steps of the algorithm.
In an "initialization step", guesses of parameter values θ ≡ [θ 1 , … θ K ] and the multinomial probabilities q are chosen. The initial values may be chosen in any way, and the robustness of the technique can be tested by seeing whether different initial guesses lead to the same final estimates or not.
We then apply the "expectation step" (E). We use these parameter values to estimate a matrix of estimated probabilities that firm i's data was generated by the
We denote these estimated probabilities p ik = P(z ik = 1), and use them to give a weight to each firm in each subsample. This gives us an estimated partition of our firms into subsamples.
We then apply the "maximization step" (M). Given the estimated partition from the previous E step, we calculate maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters θ and q. Given these updated parameter estimates, we can execute the E step again and derive an updated partition.
A recursive procedure is used. The E step is repeated using the new parameter values from the M step, and reassigns weights to firms across the subsamples. Given the revised estimated partition from the E step, the M step is then repeated to generate new parameter estimates. The expectation and maximization steps are repeated until a convergence criterion is satisfied; for example, when the absolute distance between estimates from consecutive iteration is less than a certain value. If the algorithm converges to an optimal partition estimate and set of parameter estimates, we can then assess the economic plausibility of these results.
The whole procedure can be repeated for K = 1, 2, 3 … and the results for each can be compared statistically using Akaike's (1974) 
where N(K) is the number of free parameters in the model and L is the likelihood function of the sample . The lower that value of AIC(K), the better the "fit" of the partition into K subsamples. The resulting sample is a panel of 890 firm-year observations spanning 121 firms. Our sample includes a fairly complete cross section of the steel industry. It contains all the integrated steel companies and 14 of the 42 mini-mills in Barnett and Crandall (1985) . The mini-mills we omitted are relatively small, with capacities less than 400,000 tons in 1985. Because of exit from the industry, the panel is not balanced across years.
IV. Data and Variables
We collect publicly available information on firms' lobbying for protection. This includes petitions for escape clause protection, petitions for the imposition of a countervailing duty or antidumping measures, and complaints about foreign government practices. We also include testimony in support of trade protection at congressional hearings. The names of firms undertaking the above activities were compiled from the Federal Register and the CIS Congressional Abstract Index. 11 Protection-seeking activity by a subsidiary was considered protection-seeking by the parent firm. The parent 9 SIC code 3313 is 'electro-metallurgical products except steel'; SIC code 3314 is not assigned. Our premise is that there may be habitual lobbyers and occasional lobbyers. Firms that are more specialized in steel should benefit more from protection than would more diversified firms. We thus need a measure of steel focus. For this, we use the dummy variable:
Concentration in steel production dummy (Steel) is equal to one if a firm's primary line of business, as listed in the Standard and Poor's manual for that year is 3312, 3315, 3316, or 3317 -the four SIC codes for steel production. It is also set to one if all four steel SIC codes are included in the list of the firm's lines of business.
Otherwise, the dummy is set to zero 12 . The dummy is used to capture a firm's concentration in steel production.
Innovative firms are more likely to have investment opportunities with returns higher than lobbying returns. We therefore need a measure of investment in innovation, namely:
Research and Development Spending (RD/A) is measured per dollar of total assets. If research and development spending is not reported, but all other financial data is available, we assume R&D spending to be nil. R&D spending is scaled by total assets to capture the intensity in investment in innovation.
Finally, firms should invest more in lobbying when the returns on their other investments are low and when their sales are declining. This situation also makes satisfying the "material injury" requirement in dumping and countervailing duty cases easier, so the likelihood of successful lobbying increases with poorer market performance. Such firms may also have invested less in physical assets in t he past.
To capture these characteristics, we use the following set of variables:
Accumulated Depreciation (Depreciation), taken from the firm's balance sheet and divided by the book value of its net plant and equipment, is used as a measure of the lack o f past investment in productivity (i.e. accumulated depreciation / gross plant and equipment).
Sales Growth is defined as the firm's most recent sales figure minus its sales the previous year, all divided by the latter. This variable is constructed using deflated sales figures in 1983 dollars to correct for inflation. We postulate that, on a year-by-year basis, these firm characteristics and market performance variables should affect occasional lobbyers' behavior, but not that of habitual lobbyers. That is, habitual lobbyers have a more inelastic lobbying tendency than occasional lobbying firms.
Change in Returns on
Habitual lobbying firms have already invested and set up their lobbying apparatus. Dynamic economies of scale in lobbying imply that the marginal cost of lobbying for these firms should decrease over time, while their return on lobbying rises.
Lobbying firms should eventually become inelastic participants in rent seeking. To capture the possibility that lobbying is habit forming, that past lobbying increases the current tendency to lobby, we include the lagged value of a our lobbying dummy as a final right hand side variable.
Past lobbying (lobby -1 ) is the lagged value of a dummy indicating a firm's involvement in lobbying.
Our main focus is whether " lobby -1 " increases the tendency to lobby. If lobbying has dynamic economies of scale, past lobbying should increase the likelihood of current lobbying. In addition, we expect that the propensity to lobby increases with " size,"
"steel," and " depreciation," b ut decreases with " R&D/A," " CROA," and " sales growth."
If lobbying is indeed habit forming, but not all firms are addicted to lobbying, we also expect the EM algorithm to produce more than one functional relationship between the set of independent variables and the probability to lobby. In particular, we expect that one functional form should describe habitual lobbying while other functional forms should describe occasional lobbying. For habitual lobbyers, past lobbying should be much more important to t he extent that it may be the only significant determinant of current lobbying for that group. All the other variables should matter more for occasional lobbyers, while past lobbying ought to be much less important. Table 1 reports the correlation matrix of our data. The lobbying dummy is positively and significantly correlated with size, steel production focus, depreciation (a proxy for older physical assets), and with the dummy indicating past lobbying. Lobbying is negatively and significantly correlated with sales growth, but insignificantly negatively correlated with changes in the returns on assets. Contrary to our expectations, the lobbying dummy is positively correlated with R&D spending, 13 but the correlation is insignificant.
V. Results
[ Table 1 about here]
Overall, a quick scan of the data suggests that lobbyers are larger, more concentrated in steel production, and have invested less in modernizing their plant and equipment. Also, lobbyers suffer from declining sales and returns on assets. Past period lobbying also seems to increase the probability of current period lobbying.
We run the algorithm described in section III with all the independent variables included assuming 1, 2 and 3 pools in the data (i.e. K = 1, 2 and 3). The resulting estimates, standard deviation (STD) and p-value are reported in table 2.
[ Table 2 about here]
13 Many non-lobbying firms are smaller firms not reporting R&D spending. They also tend to exit the industry after 1984 (Lenway, Morck and Yeung (1996) ). We obtain the correlation matrix based on firm-year entries. Larger lobbying firms which lasted for the whole sample period are than given a greater weight.
When there is only one pool (i.e. K = 1), the model is equivalent to an ordinary probit on pooled firm level panel data. In the one pool model, lobbyers tend to be larger firms that are more concentrated in steel production and that have declining market performance and low levels of investment in productivity improvements. The focal result, however, is that past lobbying significantly increases the likelihood of current lobbying, consistent with lobbying being habit-forming.
When we allow the data to form two pools (i.e. K = 2), our firms appear to cleanly sort themselves into habitual and occasional lobbyers. In the first pool, past lobbying positively and h ighly significantly affects the probability of current lobbying. Size and Steel also positively and significantly affect the probability of current lobbying.
However, all other variables are insignificant. These are the characteristics of habitual lobbying: a firm finds the dynamic economies of scale in lobbying and becomes an inelastic supplier of lobbying.
In the second pool, lagged lobbying does not affect the probability of current lobbying. The coefficient for lagged lobbying is negative and insignificant. Size, Steel
and Depreciation are positive and significant while Sales Growth is negative and significant, indicating that larger steel firms with older equipment become more inclined to seek protection when they experience poorer sales growth. Both CROA and RD/A are insignificant.
We hypothesize that the first pool contains habitual lobbyers while the second contains occasional lobbyers. All estimated coefficients (except that on past lobbying) for the pool of occasional lobbyers are greater in magnitude than those for the pool of habitual lobbyers, which is consistent with habitual lobbyers having a more inelastic tendency to lobby. Unfortunately, we are aware of no statistically rigorous way to test the differences between these sets of coefficient estimates.
The three-pool model distinguishes two groups, the first and third, with lobbying determinants similar to those of occasional and habitual lobbyers in the two-pool model.
A further group, the second pool contains firms whose lobbying depends on both firm characteristics and past lobbying. A plausible conjecture might be that these firms are in the process of becoming habitual lobbyers.
Unfortunately, the likelihood surface in the neighborhood of q = (1, 0, 0, ..) under the null hypothesis is discontinuous, so ordinary likelihood ratio tests cannot determine the most likely number of pools ( K). However, we can use the Akaike's (1974) information criterion AIC(K)= -2 ln L + 2 N(K), where N(K) is the number of free parameters in t he model, to roughly compare the "goodness of fit" of each alternative.
The statistically desirable K has a low AIC. Table 2 indicates that models with three pools or more (results for K > 3 are not shown) fit less well than the one pool and two pools models. However, the one and two pools models are virtually indistinguishable from each other.
The viability of the two pool hypothesis therefore must depend on whether the partition it implies is consistent with a plausible economic explanation of why habitual lobbyers should act differently than occasional lobbyers. To verify the hypothesis that the first pool contains habitual lobbyers while the second contains occasional lobbyers, we need to assign firms to either the first or second pool.
The probit estimates shown in Table 2 are based on estimates of the probabilities that each firm i belongs to each subsample k. As was described in section 3, we reestimate the probability that firm i belongs in subsample k, p ik = P(z ik = 1), each time we execute the E step of the EM algorithm. The values of p ik used in the final M step before convergence, the step that generated the parameter estimates shown in Table 2 , can be used to assign each firm to the subsample most likely to have generated its observed data.
That is, we assign firm i to subsample k if and only if p ik > p ij for all j where 1 ≤ j ≤ K and j ≠ k
The comparisons between the two pools are tabulated in Table 3 . Pool one contains 57% of our firms leaving 43% in pool two. Firms that never lobbied all end up in pool two, the occasional lobbyers' pool. The habitual lobbyers' mean and median lobbying frequency per firm are 34% and 25%, respectively, while that the occasional lobbyers' mean and median are 3% and 0%. Both the means and the medians are statistically significantly different. Habitual lobbyers are more "steel focused" than occasional lobbyers. The mean and median steel focus dummy for the former are 0.62 and 1, respectively, compared with 37% and 0 for the latter. While the difference in means is not statistically significant, the difference in medians is. The mean of the habitual lobbyers' size is 1.16 of the mean of the occasional lobbyers' size, but this difference is statistically insignificant. The habitual lobbyers' median size is 160% of the occasional lobbyers' median size, and the difference is statistically significant. The comparisons in terms of size and steel focus suggest that the occasional lobbyers' pool is composed of both smaller steel-focused firms and large f irms for which steel is only one of several lines of business. In contrast, habitual lobbyers are typically large firms focused in steel.
Interestingly, the differences in the other firm characteristics between the two groups are utterly insignificant. The two pools of firms have similar depreciation, R&D spending, sales growth, and change in returns on assets. The lack of material differences in these firm characteristics highlights the contrast between the two groups' lobbying tendency: equally poor m arket performance prompts occasional lobbyers' to lobby but has no relation to habitual lobbyers' tendency to lobby, which depends only on past lobbying.
These findings are economically sensible, and so lend credence to the two-pool model. Habitual lobbyers, being larger and more focused in the steel industry, have good reasons to initiate lobbying. Once they have started, their lobbying becomes a habit, in the sense that past lobbying leads them to lobby again regardless of their market performance. F or other firms, an intuitively sensible relationship between lobbying and changes in firm performance and past investment in productivity holds, and past lobbying does not predict present lobbying.
One plausible interpretation of our result is that to successfully win protection, a firm must lobby continually for several years. However, our data indicate that many firms continued lobbying well beyond 1984, the year comprehensive multiple bilateral voluntary export restraints agreements were set up. They kept on lobbying despite the existence of comprehensive protection that cleanly arrested the decline in their market performance.
14 This behavior observation is consistent with our premise that lobbying has dynamic economies of scale. Once a firm has invested heavily in lobbying, it is more prone to use lobbying intensively and continuously.
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VI. Conclusions
This paper examines political lobbying for trade protection by American steel firms. By pooling all firms' data, we show that, on average, past lobbying increases the likelihood of current lobbying. When we let our data sort themselves into groups according to the determinants of their lobbying, two groups emerge: occasional and habitual lobbyers. Occasional lobbyers' lobbying is closely tied to firm performance and strategy variables. Non-lobbyers group themselves with occasional lobbyers. Habitual lobbyers are larger and less diversified steel firms, and account for the lion's share of lobbying. Thus, one would expect that they are more likely to initiate lobbying. Their 14 See Lenway et al. (1996) . 15 An analogous sorting procedure puts 46%, 31%, and 23% of the firms into the first, second and third pools respectively. The first and third pools have lobbying characteristics analogous to the occasional and habitual lobbyers on the two-pool model. The second pool firms' lobbying has intermediate features.
If it contains firms in the process of becoming habitual lobbyers, their lobbying should intensify over time. This is observed. The fraction of firm-years in which lobbying occurs rises in pool two from 0.12 prior to 1983 to 0.21 after 1982. For pools one and three, lobbying intensity falls from 0.04 to 0.01 and from 0.17 to 0.13 respectively. Pool two firms show rising ROA and falling R&D, consistent with their becoming "hooked" rent-seekers. However, these grouping are highly uncertain because the AIC of the three-pool model indic ates relatively very poor statistical fit.
lobbying becomes habitual, in the sense that current lobbying is explained by past lobbying but is relatively unrelated to their performance. Overall, our findings support the view that, because of the dynamic economies of scale in rent-seeking, lobbying for protection can become habitual. 
Appendix
In this appendix, we present the technical details of the expectation-maximization EM algorithm of Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1997) 
where β k ,α k and b k are unknown parameters, which can be different for different subsamples of firms, and the errors ε it are iid with a standard normal distribution. The model assumes that firm i lobbies in period t if and only if its profit from doing so is above a threshold profit level, ~* y it . It follows that the probability firm i will lobby in period t fs P y P y P y for firm i a member of subsample k. P denotes probability, and Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Note that we can assume ~* y it = 0 without loss of generality for any nonzero threshold will be absorbed into the intercept term k β in (A2).
Define the vector of parameters θ k = (β k ,α k , b k ) and recall the definitions of the vector y it = (y i1 , … y it )', and matrix x it = (x i1 , ... x it )' for t = 1, … T i . The l ikelihood function contribution by the i th firm, a member of subsample k, is then 
If we knew which firms belonged in which subsample, we could obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters θ k = ( β k ,α k , b k ) in (A4) by running a probit regression procedure over each of the K subsamples.
We do not know which firms actually belong to which subsample, so we assume the actual partition to be defined by the multinomial random variable z i = (z i1 , ... z iK ) with
We assume the elements of z i to be iid and to have a multinomial distribution with parameters K and q = (q 1 , ... q K ). If we knew the true values of q and θ ≡ (θ 1 , … θ K ), we could assign each firm to the subsample whose parameters are most likely to have generated its observed data, and so assign z ik to zero or one for all firms.
Because we know the true values of neither the z i nor (q, θ), we must estimate both. As was pointed out in the text, the difficulty is that we must assume values for the z i to estimate ( q, θ), and must assume values of ( q, θ) to estimate the z i . The EM algorithm allows us to estimate the z i and (q, θ) recursively. The expectation (E) step lets us estimate P( z ik = 1) ∀ i, k given known values of (q, θ). The maximization (M) step lets us estimate (q, θ) given known values of the z i . We begin by using the expectation (E) step to estimate the z i assuming arbitrary initial guesses as to the value of (q, θ).
These estimates of the z i let us use the maximization (M) step to produce updated values of (q, θ). The idea is to continue updating z i and (q, θ) until some convergence criterion is met.
The E step works as follows. Assume we know ( q, θ). The joint likelihood function of the sample is 
By Bayes' rule, the estimated probability that firm i belongs in subsample k is 
U sing (A7), we can assign weights to firm i in each subsample k. We can also assign firm i to the subsample k whose lobbying model is most likely to have given rise to that firm's observed data. The former procedure produces Table 2; the latter generates Table   3 .
The M step works as follows. Assume we know the z i . Substituting ik p in ( 
where λ is a Langrange multiplier. We want to maximize H with respect to the parameters θ = (θ 1 , … θ K ) and q = (q 1 , … q K ). 
which is the likelihood function of a mixture model, as in Desarbo (1994, 1995) . It is well known that maximum likelihood estimates are consistent under regular conditions. Therefore, the EM estimates, which are exactly the maximum likelihood estimates, are consistent.
To summarize, our procedure is as follows:
Initial step: Choose an arbitrary initial guess as to the values of (q, θ).
E-step: Substitute the estimates of (q, θ) into equation (A7) to compute updated estimates of ik p .
M-
Step: Obtain maximum likelihood estimates of θ by maximizing (A9) using (A13) and q using (A12).
We repeat the E and M steps until the sum of the absolute distances between all the current and updated parameter estimates is less than 10 -6 . For discussion of the convergence properties of the EM algorithm, see Amemiya (1985) , Render and Walker (1984) , Desarbo (1994, 1995) , and references therein.
